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This paper describes central topics in our research program on social preferences. The 
discussion covers experimental designs that discriminate among alternative components of 
preferences such as unconditional altruism, positive reciprocity, trust (in positive reciprocity), 
negative reciprocity, and fear (of negative reciprocity). The paper describes experimental data on 
effects of social distance and decision context on reciprocal behavior and male vs. female and 
group vs. individual differences in reciprocity. The exposition includes experimental designs that 
provide direct tests of alternative models of social preferences and summarizes implications of 
data for the models.  The discussion reviews models of other-regarding preferences that are and 
are not conditional on others’ revealed intentions and the implications of data for these models.  
 
1. Introduction 
The paper describes our research program on social preferences in which the central 
objective is to improve theory through a program of experimental testing and theoretical 
modeling motivated by data. Content will be drawn from several papers, and co-authors will be 
cited in the context of questions addressed by the research. 
There are many other research programs in this area but I will only be discussing my own 
and my co-authors’ research (with apologies to other researchers whose work is not discussed).  
The focus on our own research program facilitates a structured discussion of the relationship 
between specific features of experimental designs and theory development objectives.   
This research program on social preferences is based on acceptance of the objective of 
parsimony in theoretical modeling (Samuelson, 1947), of never including within a model any 
complication that is not necessary to explain the phenomena being studied. Application of 
parsimony to theoretical modeling of social preferences and design of experiments to test the 
models is interpreted as leading to a focus first on the question of when the “economic man” 
model does not predict well, and models of “other-regarding” preferences are needed, and 
subsequently on when the other-regarding preferences need to include beliefs and/or intentions.    2
The logic of this application of parsimony is as follows. We begin by noting that the 
simplest model one can develop is the “economic man” model of self-regarding preferences in 
which the only thing an agent cares about in any context is his own material rewards.  As is well 
documented by a large literature, the self-regarding preferences model does not predict well in 
many contexts in which distributional fairness is a salient concern.
1  This suggests that we first 
consider models of unconditional other-regarding preferences because such distributional 
preferences can be introduced into economic models by simply redefining the goods over which 
preferences are defined while preserving conventional regularity properties of the models such as 
completeness, transitivity, convexity and, perhaps, monotonicity.  But if the other-regarding 
preferences that are modeled are conditional on – or “include” – reactions to others’ past actions 
or beliefs about their future actions then that is a more fundamental departure from traditional 
economic theory.  And so again, by the parsimony objective of theoretical modeling, one does not 
want to introduce such complications into models if, or when, they are not needed to maintain 
consistency between theory and data. 
The approach of our research program is based on experimental designs that discriminate 
between the observable implications of unconditional other-regarding preferences and conditional 
preferences involving reactions to others’ prior actions (such as positive or negative reciprocity) 
or beliefs about others’ future actions (such as trust or fear). The reason to make these 
discriminations is that unconditional other-regarding preferences can be modeled without 
introducing intentions or beliefs by simply expanding the identity of goods to include other 
agents’ incomes or consumption goods.  In contrast, reciprocity makes preferences over goods 
dependent on perceptions of others’ past actions (or attributions of their intentions) and trust or 
fear makes preferences over goods dependent on beliefs about others future reactions to one’s 
own actions. 
Another manifestation of application of the parsimony objective is that if experiments 
reveal that one needs to incorporate intentions and beliefs in some contexts, but not others, then it   3
is desirable to develop a unified approach to modeling behavior in games both with and without 
reciprocal motivation. I shall discuss some models in the literature and our direct tests of those 
models, and then review some new models that my co-authors and I are developing for distinct 
patterns of behavior that are conditional, or are not conditional, on others’ revealed intentions.  
When discussing these models, I shall explain how they are variations on the same underlying 
model and hence an example of this last application of the parsimony objective, of developing a 
unified approach to modeling both less and more complicated instances of social preferences. 
I begin with a game that provides an illustration of our approach to experimenting with 
fairness games.  The game used in the discussion is the investment game. 
 
2. An Example: The Investment Game 
An experiment with the investment game has the following characteristics (see, for 
examples, Berg, et al., 1995; Cox, 2004).  Subjects are randomly paired.  Each subject in each 
pair is given $10.  Second movers are told to keep their $10.  A first mover can either keep her 
$10 or give some or all of it to the second mover. Any amount given is multiplied by 3 by the 
experimenter. A second mover can either keep all of any amount received or return part or all of 
it to the paired first mover. The game is played only once. The experimental protocol uses double 
blind payoffs in which any individual subject’s responses are anonymous to the experimenter and 
other subjects. All of the features of the experimental design and protocol are common 
information given to all subjects. 
 
2.1 Predictions of the “Economic Man” Model 
Predictions of the traditional economic man model for this game are transparent.  Since 
second movers care only about their own material gain, they will keep any tripled amount sent by 
first movers. Since first movers care only about their own material gain, and know that second 
movers have the same kind of preferences, first movers will send nothing. Zero amounts returned   4
and sent are the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game, given the economic man assumption 
about preferences. The predicted outcome is inefficient: each subject pair is predicted to get $20 
in payoff  –  only the endowment  –  when it could have gotten as much as $40. 
 
2.2  Behavior 
Experiments with the investment game have been conducted by several researchers and 
the results look pretty much the same regardless of who runs the experiment. Figure 1 shows 
behavior in the investment game reported in Cox (2004). The amounts sent are represented by the 
striped bars and the amounts returned are portrayed by the solid bars.  Of course, what the 
economic man model predicts is that there won’t be any visible bars (of either type) in Figure 1.  
There are six subject pairs shown at the left side of the figure with no bars.  The other 26 subject 
pairs do not behave like that. The overwhelming majority of first movers send money. Some 
second movers who receive money keep it all, as the economic man model predicts.  So there are 
a few cases in which the first movers did not behave like economic man and the second movers 
did. But a large proportion of the second movers did not behave according to the economic man 
model either. There are even four subject pairs in which the first movers sent all $10 and the 
second movers returned $20, in other words the second movers chose the equal split fairness focal 
point in which each subject in the pair gets $20, exactly double his/her endowment. 
Behavior in the investment game is representative of many games in the literature in 
which deviations from the economic man model’s predictions are consistent with trust (by first 
movers) and reciprocity (by second movers). And many authors have concluded that trust and 
reciprocity has been observed in the experimental games like this.  But the experimental design 
actually does not support that conclusion.  The reason is that first movers may send money to 
second movers because of unconditional altruistic preferences: it only costs a second mover 33 
cents for each $1 increase in the other person’s money payoff.  Furthermore, second movers may   5
return money to first movers (who have less, after sending some of their endowment) because of 
either unconditional altruism or inequality aversion.
2  
 If this behavior could all be explained by unconditional altruism then that would be a 
relatively parsimonious extension of theory: just define the preferences over both my income and 
your income, assume positive monotonicity in both variables, and assume convexity of   
indifference curves. On the other hand, if subjects’ behavior is  characterized by trust and/or 
reciprocity then the implied changes in theory are less parsimonious. Modeling trust requires 
introduction of beliefs into theory. Modeling reciprocity requires introduction of perceived 
intentions into theory. These are more extensive and less tractable changes in theory than is 
modeling unconditional altruism and – according to the objective of parsimony –  one does not 
want to introduce these complications into theory if they are not needed to explain behavior. 
In order to proceed without ambiguity in discussing the relation between theory and 
alternative experimental designs, one needs some clearly-stated definitions of terms.  Here are 
ones that will be used.  
 
2.3  Definitions of Terms for Identifying Behavioral Motivations 
  Self-regarding (or “economic man”) preferences are characterized by positively 
monotonic utility for one’s own material payoffs and indifference about others’ material payoffs. 
Other-regarding  preferences  are characterized by utility that is not constant with respect to 
variations in one’s own or others’ material payoffs. Altruistic preferences are characterized by 
utility that is monotonically increasing in others’ material payoffs as well as one’s own payoffs.  
Positive (direct) reciprocity is a motivation to adopt a generous action that benefits someone else, 
at one’s own material cost, because that person’s intentional behavior was perceived to be 
beneficial to oneself.  Trust is a belief that one agent has about another.  A trusting action is one 
that creates the possibility of mutual benefit and the risk of loss of one’s own utility if the other 
person defects.   6
  Why did I use the term “utility” in the definition of trust?  Because if one is an altruist 
and would like to send some money to the other person, even if it was certain they wouldn’t send 
anything back, then if the person doesn’t, in fact, send anything back there may be no loss in 
utility.  In that case, “trust” wouldn’t be needed to explain the first mover’s behavior; instead, the 
more parsimonious explanation – unconditional altruism – would suffice. Thus the question about 
identifying trusting behavior becomes: “Does a first mover in the investment game send more 
money to the second mover than he would in another game in which the first mover has the same 
set of feasible choices as in the investment game but knows for sure that the second mover cannot 
return anything?”  This is clearly a different question than: “Does the first mover send any money 
to the second mover in the investment game?”   
  Negative (direct) reciprocity is a motivation to adopt an action that harms someone else, 
at one’s own material cost, because that person’s intentional behavior was perceived to be 
harmful to oneself.  Fear is a belief that one agent has about another.  An action that is fearful of 
another is one that forgoes an otherwise preferred action because of a belief that the other agent 
will inflict costly punishment as a response to choice of the otherwise-preferred action.  Negative 
reciprocity and fear will be discussed in section 3, in the context of experiments with the 
moonlighting game, but we first continue the discussion of experiments with the investment 
game. 
 
2.4   Investment Game Triadic Design 
 Consider again the investment game, but instead of running it by itself, embed it in an 
experiment with three games, in what we call a “triadic design.”  Each game is an experimental 
treatment. The objective of the triadic experimental design is to construct treatments that reveal 
whether behavior in a central game of interest (in the present case, the investment game) can be 
represented with a model of unconditional other-regarding preferences or, instead, requires the 
less parsimonious approach of constructing a model that incorporates agents’ attribution of the   7
intentions revealed by others’ past actions and/or beliefs about their future actions.  In order to 
support observational discrimination between these distinct motives for behavior, dictator control 
treatments are designed so as to provide subjects with the same (own income, other’s income) 
feasible choice sets as does the investment game but remove the decision opportunity of the 
paired subject, and thereby remove the possible effects of beliefs and intentions attribution on 
behavior. 
The experimental design for the investment game includes the following three treatments. 
Treatment A is the investment game in which each first mover and each second mover is given a 
$10 endowment and each $1 increase in the second mover’s money payoff costs the first mover 
33 cents. Treatment B is a dictator game, with the same endowments as the investment game, 
which gives dictators the same feasible set of choices (over the ordered pairs of their own and the 
other’s payoffs) that first movers have in the investment game.  So what is the difference?  First 
movers have exactly the same decisions to make, and the same feasible set, in treatment A and 
treatment B.  The difference is that they know for sure that in treatment B the second movers 
cannot return anything.  So if we observe that subjects send significantly less in treatment B than 
they do in treatment A, then we can conclude that amounts sent in treatment A cannot be fully 
explained by altruism, that we need something else, and the natural thing of course is trust. Why? 
Because in treatment A the first movers can trust that the second movers will share part of the 
increased total payoff from the tripling of amounts sent, and as a result send more in treatment A 
than in treatment B. 
  Treatment C is the dictator control treatment for reciprocity. Treatment C gives dictators 
the same choices and feasible sets that second movers have in the investment game.  Treatment C 
is constructed as follows. The dictators correspond to the second movers in the investment game 
(treatment A). Of course, the non-dictators do not have a decision to make. Each dictator is given 
a $10 endowment.  Each non-dictator is given an endowment equal to the amount kept (i.e. not 
sent) by a specific first mover in treatment A.  Furthermore, each dictator is given an additional   8
dollar amount equal to the amount received by a specific second mover in treatment A from the 
tripled amount sent by a first mover in treatment A. The subjects are informed with a table of the 
exact inverse relation between the number of additional dollars received by a dictator and the 
endowment of the anonymously-paired other subject.  The subjects are not informed that their 
endowments are determined by choices of subjects in treatment A to avoid suggesting indirect 
reciprocity towards other subjects.   
 
2.5   Conclusions about Behavior 
Figure 2 shows behavior in Treatments A and B in the experiment reported in Cox (2004).  
This experiment was run with a double-blind payoff protocol in which the responses by 
individual subjects are anonymous to both the other subjects and the experimenter. Comparing 
the amounts sent in treatments A and B, one observes that more subjects send zero in the first 
mover dictator control (Treatment B) than in the investment game.  Furthermore, more subjects 
send half ($5) or all ($10) of their endowments in the investment games than in Treatment B.  So 
there is indeed a quite noticeable difference.  Several parametric and non-parametric tests of these 
data support the conclusion that behavior in the investment game is known to exhibit trust 
because first movers send significantly more in the investment game (Treatment A) than in the 
first mover dictator control treatment (Treatment B).  Thus behavior in the investment game is 
known to exhibit trust because first movers send significantly more in the investment game than 
in the first-mover dictator control treatment. 
Figure 3 shows data for Treatments A and C.  If one looks at the difference between the bars 
representing data from Treatments A and C, one sees a lot more solid bars of greater height, 
which suggests that play in the investment game is characterized by positive reciprocity.  Several 
parametric and non-parametric tests support the conclusion that behavior in the investment game 
does exhibit positive reciprocity because second movers return significantly more in the 
investment game (Treatment A) than in the second mover dictator control treatment (Treatment   9
C).  Thus, behavior in the investment game is known to exhibit positive reciprocity because 
second movers returned significantly more in the investment game than in the second mover 
dictator control treatment. 
 
2.6  Implications for Theory 
This experiment has several implications for theoretical modeling.  The first is that 
consistency with behavior requires theory to incorporate altruistic other-regarding preferences.  
The reason is that the majority of subjects send positive amounts of money to another in the 
dictator control treatments. Furthermore, data-consistent theoretical models must incorporate 
beliefs about others’ behavior because the triadic design reveals trusting behavior in the 
investment game.  Finally, data-consistent models must incorporate other-regarding preferences 
that are conditional on the actions of others because the triadic design reveals positively 
reciprocal behavior in the investment game. 
 
3.  Conclusions from Other Experiments with Game Triads 
The investment game is the first of several fairness games that my co-authors and I have 
experimented with using triadic designs. Another is the moonlighting game (Cox, Sadiraj, and 
Sadiraj, 2006), which is an extension of the investment game in which both first and second 
movers can take money as well as give it.
3  Similarly to our finding for the investment game, we 
conclude that behavior in the moonlighting game exhibits both positive reciprocity and trust by 
comparing behavior in the central game of interest with behavior in appropriately-designed 
dictator control treatments. Unlike the investment game, the moonlighting game can elicit 
negative reciprocity and fear (of negative reciprocity) because subjects can take money from each 
other.  Data from the moonlighting game and dictator controls provide weak support for negative 
reciprocity and fear because some test results are significant and others are not.    10
The trust game is a simplified version of the investment game in which the first mover 
can either “exit” (which corresponds to sending zero in the investment game) or “engage,” that is 
to say move down the game tree, in which case the second mover has choice between keeping all 
of an increased total payoff or sharing it in one specific way.
4  Behavior in the trust game is 
invariant with a doubling of money payoffs (Cox and Deck, 2005). Positive reciprocity is 
significant in the trust game with a single blind protocol but not with a double blind protocol 
(Cox and Deck, 2005).  This result has possible implications for understanding behavior in other 
games for which experimenters have only used single blind protocols.   
In a single blind protocol, other subjects in an experiment cannot identify what a specific 
individual subject has done. In a double blind protocol, neither other subjects nor the 
experimenter can identify what any individual subject has done. Thus if the second mover, for 
example, wants to defect and keep all the money, that second mover does not have to worry about 
being frowned upon, or worse, perhaps not invited to be in future experiments or whatever else 
subjects might imagine, if the experimenter uses a double blind payoff protocol. In contrast, 
consider the implications of a single-blind protocol in a fairness game.  For illustration consider 
the possible case in which a first mover has sent his entire $10 endowment to the paired second 
mover.  And suppose that the second mover considers keeping all of the $40 and leaving the 
paired first mover with $0.  In a typical single blind protocol, the defecting second mover would 
be called by name to collect his $40 in a face-to-face interaction with the experimenter. 
Furthermore, the experimenter is typically a professor, and a professor is arguably an authority 
figure for student subjects. The knowledge that subjects will have to face the experimenter to 
collect their payoffs does dissuade some potential defectors from defecting in the trust game.  
Since a large majority of experiments with fairness games have been run with single blind 
protocols, our finding may imply that some rethinking about conclusions is needed. One cannot 
know, a priori, all of the contexts in which a double blind protocol might yield different behavior 
than a single blind protocol.  If one observes reciprocity in a double blind experiment then it is a   11
really strong result which indicates that the norm for reciprocity is “internalized.”   In contrast, if 
reciprocity is observed in a single blind experiment, but not in an otherwise identical double blind 
experiment, then one needs to revisit the question of what the experimenter is attempting to 
measure because the experimenter-as-observer would have been shown to be a significant 
treatment.  Furthermore, different experimenters may themselves have significant treatment 
effects: the prospect of collecting money payoffs resulting from defection from an old professor 
(arguably a father or mother figure) may be more constraining than the prospect of collecting 
such payoffs from a young graduate assistant.  
Returning to results from experiments reported in our previous papers, one notes further 
conclusions as follows. We found that negative reciprocity and fear are not significant in the 
punishment mini-ultimatum game (Cox and Deck, 2005), which is a simplified version of the 
traditional ultimatum game.
5  We found that play in the punishment mini-ultimatum game is 
invariant with framing the task as market exchange (Cox and Deck, 2005).  We also found that 
negative reciprocity is significant in the punishment mini-ultimate game if it is embedded within a 
context of similar games but not when played in isolation (Cox and Deck, 2005).  This last 
finding is actually a little bit troubling for developing theoretical models in this area; it shows that 
it can indeed be quite a bit more complicated than we would like it to be. We also found that 
females are less positively reciprocal in investment games than are males, and that groups are less 
generous in the investment game than are individuals (Cox, 2002).   Cox and Deck (2006) studies 
gender differences using a triadic experimental design including the trust game. The data indicate 
that women are more sensitive than men to the costs of generous actions. The factors that affect 
the level of observed generosity are reciprocal motivation, the level of money payoffs, and the 
level of social distance in the experimental protocol.  The relatively greater sensitivity of women 
to the costs of generous behavior can explain much of the apparent inconsistencies among 
gender-difference experiments of previously reported in the literature. Cox and Deck 
(forthcoming) reports a trust game with first mover trembling, which is a game in which “nature”   12
randomly determines whether a first mover’s decision is implemented or reversed.  Data from this 
trust game with trembling indicate that second movers give first movers the benefit of the doubt 
in reacting to realization of the ungenerous branch of the game tree. However, first movers do not 
anticipate this forgiving response by second movers and are less likely to pursue the mutually 
beneficial outcome when there is trembling. 
   
4.  Models of Unconditional Other-regarding Preferences 
    Now I want to switch to my second theme and look at some specific models of social 
preferences. In models of inequality aversion, utility is increasing with one’s own money payoff 
but decreasing with the difference between one’s own and others’ money payoffs.
6  In the quasi-
maximin model, utility is increasing with an agent’s own money payoff, with the lowest of all 
agents’ payoffs (the maximin property), and with the total of all agents’ payoffs (the efficiency 
property).
7 An alternative model motivated by data is the egocentric altruism model (Cox and 
Sadiraj, 2006), which contains other-regarding preferences that are characterized by 
monotonicity, convexity, and egocentricity (defined below). 
  
4.1  A  Direct Test of Inequality Aversion 
    A direct test of inequality aversion is provided by the first-mover dictator control 
treatment for the investment game triad with the following design (Cox and Sadiraj, 2006). The 
dictator is given $10. The anonymously-paired subject is given $10. The dictator can keep all of 
his $10 or give any integral part of it to the paired person. Any amount given is tripled by the 
experimenter. Behavior in this experiment was as follows. First, 19 of 30 or 63% of the dictators 
gave positive amounts to the other person. The average amount given was $3.63.  The average 
payoff of dictators was $6.37 and the average payoff of non-dictators was $20.89, which implies 
a high degree of inequality favoring the other person. The inconsistency with the inequality 
aversion models does not just reflect an inconsistency with the parametric forms of these models;   13
instead, it is a fundamental inconsistency with inequality aversion, per se. The behavior of the 
37% of subjects that is consistent with inequality aversion is also consistent with self-regarding 
(or economic man) preferences, which is the preferred model because it is the simpler of the two. 
Therefore, inequality aversion is not needed to rationalize the behavior of any subjects in this 
experiment.    
  
4.2 Direct Tests of the Quasi-Maximin Model 
Cox and Sadiraj (2006) report two direct tests of the quasi-maximin model with 
specially-designed dictator experiments. In each experiment, a dictator is given a choice among 
three rows of a table containing payoffs for herself and three other people. In one experiment, the 
dictator’s own payoff and the minimum payoff is the same in all three rows but the total payoff 
varies between rows. In the other experiment, the dictator’s own payoff and the total payoff is the 
same in all three rows but the minimum payoff varies between rows.  The experiment results are 
that the choices of 85% of the subjects in one experiment and of 94% of the subjects in the other 
experiment are inconsistent with quasi-maximin preferences.   
  
4.3 More Information about Subjects’ Preferences 
   The dictator experiment discussed in section 4.1, that provides a direct test of inequality 
aversion, reveals that a high majority of subjects behave like altruists when faced with the choice 
between choosing zero and giving a positive amount to the paired subject when the price of each 
$1 given is 33 cents.  But this experiment leaves open the question of how subjects behave when 
they can either give or take money from another. Will they still appear to be altruists?   
In experiment 4 of Cox and Sadiraj (2006), a subject can choose zero or give money to 
the other subject or take money from him. The price of each $1 increase in the other subject’s 
payoff is 33 cents.  Each $1 taken from the other subject increases the dictator’s payoff by $1.  
Thus the experiment reviewed here differs from the experiment reviewed in section 4.1 only by   14
introduction of the opportunity to take money as well as give it or choose zero.  This is the first-
mover dictator control experiment for the moonlighting game (Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj, 2006).  
Data from this experiment are strikingly different from data for the experiment reviewed in 
section 4.1: the presence of the opportunity to take money causes a large majority of subjects to 
do just that; in fact, 69% of the subjects took money from the other person and 56% of them took 
the maximum possible amount of $5.  Thus, in the absence of an opportunity to take money a 
high majority of subjects appear to be altruists but in the presence of opportunities to either give 
or take money a high majority of subjects appear to be selfish. Is this behavior contradictory? 
 
4.4  The Egocentric Altruism Model 
Behavior in these two dictator experiments can be rationalized by a model of other-
regarding preferences with conventional properties known as the egocentric altruism model (Cox 
and Sadiraj, 2006). A utility function  ) , ( y m u  defined on the dictator’s (“my”) money payoff m  
and the paired subject’s (“your”) money payoff  y  that is monotonically increasing in both 
payoffs, has indifference curves that are strictly convex to the origin, and exhibits “egocentrism” 
can rationalize the data.  Egocentrism is defined as  ) , ( ) , ( b a u a b u > , for all a and b such that 
0 ≥ > a b ; in words, the individual is assumed to be an altruist but not a “Mother Teresa.”  An 
additional regularity property can be assumed for the model and maintain consistency with data 
described above: the utility function is assumed to be CES, hence homothetic, which implies that 
slopes of indifference curves are constant along rays from the origin, hence preferences over 
relative income  y m/  are defined in a straightforward way.  The egocentric altruism model is 
consistent with almost all of the data from all four of the dictator experiments described in this 
section of the paper (Cox and Sadiraj, 2006). Furthermore, this model is robust, it can also 
explain data from experiments with proposer competition and responder competition (Cox and   15
Sadiraj, 2006) and data from experiments with voluntary contributions to public goods (Cox and 
Sadiraj, 2005). 
 
5.  Incorporating Intentions into a Model of Social Preferences  
As explained above, the egocentric altruism model can explain data from several types of 
dictator experiments while the inequality aversion and quasi-maximin models cannot explain 
such data.  But neither the egocentric altruism model nor the other models incorporate intentions. 
Furthermore, this limitation is known to have empirical relevance because of experiments that 
identify the significance of reciprocity in various contexts, including experiments with the 
investment game (Cox, 2002, 2004), the trust game (Cox and Deck, 2005, 2006), and the 
moonlighting game (Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj, 2006).  
An implication of the parsimony objective of theoretical modeling is that intentions 
should be incorporated into a model that can rationalize data from experiments without reciprocal 
motivation, such as dictator games, rather than proceeding in an orthogonal direction to develop 
unrelated models to explain intentions-conditional behavior such as reciprocity. This approach 
leads to development of a unified body of theory for modeling both less and more complicated 
instances of revealed social preferences. 
 
5.1  A Parametric Model of Reciprocity and Fairness 
  The egocentric altruism model is extended to incorporate intentions in the “tractable 
model of reciprocity and fairness” (Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad, forthcoming) by assuming that 
the parameter weight that applies to another’s money payoff is not an exogenous constant but, 
instead, is given by a function of a reciprocity variable r  and a status variable s  that are 
dependent on the other person’s revealed intentions and social status characteristics that are 
relevant to the decision environment. The resulting utility function is a modified CES function of   16
a decision-maker’s own (“my”) money payoff m  and the other’s (“your”) money payoff  y with 
a multiplicative weight for  y  given by the weighting function  ). , ( s r θ   The marginal willingness 
to pay to increase the other’s payoff, when it is equal to one’s own, is equal to  ). , ( s r θ   This θ  
function is assumed to be weakly increasing in both arguments, to have the neutral-state property 
given by  0 ) 0 , 0 ( ≥ θ , and to be negative when r and  s  are sufficiently negative.  Thus 
individuals are assumed to non-malevolent in their baseline state of  ), 0 , 0 ( ) , ( = s r  to be 
benevolent if the reciprocity and status variables are sufficiently positive, and to be malevolent if 
the reciprocity and status variables are sufficiently negative.  In applying the model to data, the θ  
function is assumed to be identical across individuals except for a mean zero idiosyncratic term; 
in other words, individual agents are allowed to differ in their baseline altruism. 
Data used in estimating the model come from several distinct types of experiments.   
Application of the model to data from the baseline dictator game, with random role assignment, 
reported by Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren (2002) yields estimates of individuals’ residual or 
baseline altruism.  Effects of experimenter-induced status on altruism are derived by applying the 
model to data from the dictator game with earned endowments reported by Cherry, Frykblom, 
and Shogren (2002).  Estimates of subjects’ reciprocity are derived by applying the model to data 
from Stackelberg duopoly (Huck, Muller, and Norman, 2001) and moonlighting games (Cox, 
Sadiraj, and Sadiraj, 2006). Reciprocity with context-dependent property rights is studied by 
applying the model to mini-ultimatum game data reported by Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher (2003).  
Effects of reciprocity and status on subjects’ other-regarding behavior are derived by applying the 
model to data from ultimatum games with random and contest assignment of the first-mover role, 
reported by Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994).  Individuals’ efficiency-increasing 
behavior is studied by applying the model to data from the first-mover dictator control treatment 
in the investment game triadic-design experiment reported in Cox (2004) and Cox and Sadiraj 
(2006).    17
 
5.2  A Non-parametric Model of Revealed Altruism 
The egocentric altruism model and tractable model of reciprocity and fairness are further 
generalized in a non-parametric model based on partial orderings of preferences and opportunity 
sets (Cox, Freidman, and Sadiraj, 2006).  In this model, one agent’s other-regarding preferences 
can depend on the actions of the other agent.  The model is based on two partial orderings and 
two axioms that link them.  The partial ordering of preferences is a formal representation of what 
it means for one preference ordering to be “more altruistic than” another.  The partial ordering of 
opportunity sets is a formal representation of what it means for one opportunity set to be “more 
generous than” another.  These two partial orderings are linked by two axioms.  Axiom R  states 
that more generous choices by the first mover in an extensive form game induce more altruistic 
preferences in the second mover.  Axiom S  states that the reciprocity effect on preferences is 
stronger following an act of commission by the first mover than following an act of omission.  
This non-parametric model is applied to data from the investment game, Stackelberg duopoloy 
game, and Stackelberg mini-game.   
 
6.  Summary 
This research program involves experiments with “fairness games” designed to reveal the 
characteristics of individuals’ social preferences and an approach to modeling these social 
preferences based on application of the objective of parsimony.  The experiments reveal that 
behavior in fairness games exhibits unconditional altruism (“others’ payoffs matter”), trust 
(“beliefs matter”), and reciprocity (“intentions matter”).  Whether or not reciprocity is exhibited 
in some games depends upon whether the experimenter uses a single-blind or double-blind 
protocol (“who is observing matters”) and the context in which a specific game is embedded 
(“fairness is a relative concept”).  The experiments reveal that other-regarding behavior differs   18
across small groups and individuals and across males and females (“type of decision-maker 
matters”). 
Modeling behavior in fairness games involves complications that vary with 
characteristics of the games.  In simple dictator games that do not elicit reciprocal motivation, 
behavior is inconsistent with inequality aversion and quasi-maximin preferences. Behavior in 
these dictator games and in games of proposer competition, responder competition, and voluntary 
contributions to public goods can be rationalized by a model of egocentric altruism. Behavior in 
games such as the investment, trust, moonlighting, ultimatum, mini-ultimatum, Stackelberg 
duopoly, and Stackelberg mini-games that do elicit reciprocal motivation can be modeled with a 
tractable parametric extension of the egocentric altruism model and with a non-parametric 
revealed altruism model based on a partial ordering of preferences (“more altruistic than”), a 
partial ordering of opportunity sets (“more generous than”), and “reciprocity” and “status” 
axioms that link the two partial orderings.   19
Footnotes 
 
*  Noah Langdale Jr Eminent Scholar Chair and Director of the Experimental Economics Center 
(EXCEN), Georgia State University.  This paper was written while the author was a Visiting 
Scholar at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. 
  
1.  Fehr and Gächter (2000) survey some of this literature. 
 
2.  Models of inequality averse preferences are presented by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2000). 
 
3. The moonlighting game was introduced to the literature by Abbink, et al. (2000). 
 
4. The trust game was introduced to the literature by McCabe and Smith (2000). 
 
5.  Mini-ultimatum games were previously experimented with by Bolton and Zwick (1995), Gale, 
et al. (1995), and Falk, et al. (2003). 
 
6.  See Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). 
 
7.  The quasi-maximin model was introduced to the literature by Charness and Rabin (2003).  20
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